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almost without exception clung to it. It was thus laid down
in the federal courts until recently. Hansen v. United States,
156 U. S. 51; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574. But in 1924 a new
test was formulated for the federal courts. .D was accused
of murder and was subjected to a severe and continuous
questioning, despite the fact that he was very ill. On the thirteenth day, being exhausted, he made a confession, apparently to get rid of his questioners. Nevertheless the Court
of Appeals held the confession admissible on the ground
that it was not procured, by promise or threat-applying
the rule as follbwed by the West Virginia courts. Wan v.
United States, 289 Fed. 908. But on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court the confession was held to be inadmissible. The court broke away from the orthodox rule of
admissibility and laid down a simpler test. It stated that
the requisite of voluntariness was not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by threat or
promise, but that it must be voluntary in fact. Wan v. United
States, 266 U. S. 1, 14. It is submitted that this decision shows
a salutary tendency to break away from the mechanical test
of threat or promise, hope or fear. The proper test should be
whether the circumstances attending the confession were
such as to have created in any considerable degree a risk
that a false confession would be made. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§824.
-William Thomas O'Farrell.

SUPREME COURT REVERSES ITSELF ON QUESTION OF PARTY
WALLS-RIGHT OF THE ASSIGNEE COVENANTOR TO SUE.-In a

deed by which the grantor conveyed half of a building to
defendant, it was agreed that the dividing wall should be
a party wall and that either party, or his vendee, was to
have the right to extend the wall higher, and the other
party, or his vendee, was to pay for half of so much of the
wall as he should elect to use. The grantor conveyed the
other half of the building to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
built this wall up another story, placing the joists of defendant's floor in the new wall. Plaintiff then sued defendant for half the cost of the wall. Judgment for defendant below was reversed. A. W. Cox Department Store
v. Solof, 138 S. E. 452 (W. Va. 1927).
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The opinion of the court deals chiefly with the construction of the contract and assumes without discussion the
right of the plaintiff, as assignee of the covenantor, to sue
defendant on the covenant, a point upon which the courts
of this country are in conflict. The New York courts have
taken the view that when one party is contemplating the
erection of a wall at the time the covenant is made, and
immediately builds it, the covenant is personal and does
not run vWith the land; but when neither party iq contemplating building when the covenant is executed, andl later
an assignee of one builds the wall, there is created an
equitable charge on the land in his favor. Mott v. Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312, 31 N. E. 1907; Crawford v. Krollpf eiffer, 195 N. Y. 185, 88 N. E. 29. In Parsons v. Baltimore
Bank and Loan Association, 44 W. Va. 335, 29 S. E. 999, the
court held the covenant did not run, but that an equitable
charge was created on use of the wall by the adjoining
owner, though a building was contemplated at the time the
agreement was made, the court purporting to follow
Mott v. Oppenheimer. Under the law of New York no such
equitable charge would have arisen on the facts shown in
Parsons v. Baltimore Bank and Loan Association and Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer, supra. It is to be noted that in the principal case, at the time the agreement was made neither party
contemplated building a wall. According to the New York
view the covenant would not run with the land but an
equitable charge would be created on the non-builder's
land. Yet the court without discussion and without even
citing Parsons v. Baltimore Bank and Loan Association, assumed the covenant ran with the land and allowed the
assignee of the covenantee to recover in an action at! law.
Hence the court must have held that the covenant did run
with the land, and that the plaintiff, when he bought from
the covenantee, along with the land, got the right to enforce the covenant. This is in accord with the weight of
authority in the United States. There is no difficulty as
to privity of estate in the principal case because the covenant was in the deed of conveyance of half of the building to the defendant. The result of this decision as to the
running of the covenant and thereby overruling the dictum
of the West Virginia case cited above is to be commended.
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However, one cannot so heartily commend the decision of
such a controverted point of law by the mere assumption
-Anne Slifkin.
of it.
REAL PROPERTY-BILL TO REMOVE CLOUD WHEN REMEDY
AT LAW IS ADEQUATE.-Complainant brought a bill in equity
praying the removal of a clou4 from title to four hundred
acres of coal the ownership of which was severed from that
of the surface, and to which the complainant alleged he
had legal title. Defendant was in possession of the surface under a subsequent deed to the whole.- The court sustained a demurrer to the bill on the ground that the complainant had an adequate remedy at law. Payne, Malcolm and
Gallaher v. Fitzwater, et al., 136 S. E. 507 (W. Va. 1927).
The common law rules governing bills to remove cloud
from title are in effect in West Virginia. In the case at
bar the mineral was undeveloped and neither the complainant nor the defendant was in actual possession. West
Virginia and Virginia have, in a long line of decisions, established the rule that in order to give equity jurisdiction
to remove cloud from title the complainant must have not
only equitable and legal title but actual possession of the
Constructive possession is not a
lands in controversy.
sufficient basis fo sustain a bill to remove cloud from title.
Hitchcock v. Morrison, 47 W. Va. 206, 34 S. E. 993; Wallace
v. ElmW Grove Coal Company, 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485;
Mackey v. Maxin, 63 W. Va. 14, 59 S. E. 742. There is an
exception in some jurisdictions to the effect that where the
lands in controversy are vacant and unoccupied, constructive possession of the legal owner is sufficient. There seems
to be no such exception in West Virginia. The general
rule is that a bill to remove cloud can be maintained only
when the complainant is in actual possession of the land.
This rule however is subject to the exception that when the
complainant holds the legal and equitable title and there
is no adequate remedy at law available, equity will give
relief, Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510; Custer v.
Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183; 4 PoMEROY, EQUITY (3rd
ed.) 1399. The court held in the principal case that ejectment furnished an adequate remedy at law. This would
not have been true at common law, but West Virginia and
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